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T

HE oldest commercial airline in the Western Hemisphere was
founded in Barranquilla, Colombia, on December 5, 1919. Sociedad

Colombo-Alemana de Transportes Areos (SCADTA) initiated passenger service along the Magdalena River in Sept., 1920 with two
Junkers F-13 hydroplanes and in a few years established routes connecting the principal cities of Colombia, as well as airmail and aerial
photography services.
In his fascinating history of Colombian Aviation, Una Historia Con
Alas, the well known and respected aviation pioneer, Col. Herbert
Boy, tells the story of how Colombia moved directly from the burro
to the airplane as the principal means of transportation. SCADTA
opened international routes to other South American countries and
in 1925 made a sensational flight across the Caribbean to Miami, seeking permission to inaugurate regular service to the United States.
This flight, interestingly, led to the formation of Pan American Air-

ways.1
SCADTA is today AVIANCA (Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A.) and is recognized as a great contributor to the progress of civil
aviation in the Americas. In 1957 AVIANCA, the largest airline in
Colombia, made 47,679 flights carrying more than 1 million passengers
and more than 71 million kilos of cargo almost 23 million kilometers.
The many other aviation companies in Colombia include passenger,
all-cargo, helicopter exploration companies and fumigation and aerial
photography enterprises.
Colombia's importance historically and currently in civil aviation,
her geographic position in inter-hemispheric air routes, and the tempo
of her commerical activity commend the study of certain legal aspects
of airline passenger service.
PART I. CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY

This discussion will be mainly concerned with contractual liability

of air carriers for death or injury to passengers, and will deal with
1 In his book, Global Mission, Gen. H. H. Arnold relates that he and other
U.S. Army officers feared the consequences of allowing a "German airline" to fly
over the Panama Canal and hurriedly instigated the creation of an American airline (PAA) to carry U.S. mail from Havana to Florida, thus providing the basis
for denial of SCADTA's request.
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decisions of the Supreme Court, commentaries of leading Colombian
publicists, the validity of clauses limiting liability, and miscellaneous
factors affecting liability claims.
Decisions of the Supreme Court
Newton C. Marshall and 2 other passengers boarded a plane of
SCADTA at Quibd6, Colombia on March 10, 1934 for a routine flight
to BogotA. The flight took off under normal conditions. The route
calls for crossing the Western Cordillera of the Andes and at that point
these were the last messages received from the plane:
10:18 "Airplane in perfect condition; we can descend
through the clouds."
10:41 "Attentionl We are flying blind in the mountains; maintain contact with us."
There followed a series of "V's" on the wireless and then silence.
The plane had crashed in the rugged jungle area of the northwest
part of Colombia. All of the occupants, except Marshall, were either
killed in the crash or died from injuries. Although injured himself,
Marshall miraculously made his way to an inhabited region and was
saved. The precise cause of the accident remained undetermined.
Three years later he filed suit in Barranquilla against SCADTA
for damages in the sum of $200,000.00 Colombian pesos, and this
suit later resulted in the first Supreme Court decision in Colombia
directly on the liability of air carriers. Marshall's demand was primarily based on extracontractual liability for negligence and only
secondarily on contractual liability. The Trial Court held (and was
later sustained by the Supreme Court) that the two causes of action
were incompatible in the same complaint, and that where a contracual basis exists, an extracontractual claim in the same demand will
be disregarded unless separate injuries can be shown. The Trial Court
found the defendant airline liable on a contractual basis and set
damages at $100,000.00 Colombian pesos for physical injuries and
suffering.
The Appeal Court reversed the decision, and finally, on May 15,
1946 the Supreme Court rendered its decision affirming the exoneration of the defendant airline.2 In so doing the Court established the
much discussed doctrine of "prudence and diligence" as the standard
of care for public air carriers in Colombia.
First, the Court examined the nature of air transportation in
general and found that "

. .

. because of its characteristics, nature and

medium of movement, the aircraft is quite different from modes of
land and maritime transportation." It noted, "In Colombia there is
a lack of special legislation on air carriage. Therefore, the decisions
2 May 15, 1946 G.J. No. 2032, p. 440 (The practice in citing Supreme Court
decisions in Colombia is by date, volume or number, and page of the official publication, GacetaJudicial, rather than by names of the plaintiff and defendant. This
will be followed throughout).
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of the Court must fill the vacuum, constructing a doctrine which best
harmonizes with our general legal order, without forgetting the special
characteristics of air transportation and the necessity of the Nation
to stimulate its growth and development." Thus, the Court chose not
to apply directly the Code of Land Commerce or the Code of Maritime Commerce to air transportation.
Second, on the nature of the air carriage contract itself, the Court
held that, in the absence of special legislation and since the carrier
can offer at best relative security to the passenger, the carrier's duty
of care is one of prudence and diligence in its operations. The carrier
is not required to prove an act of God (caso fortuito) to escape liability, as was previously required of carriers engaged in land transportation.
In the words of the Court: "In order to precisely define the contractual obligations of safety in air transportation, the factor of risk
must play a preponderating role . . .For this reason the obligation
of safe carriage on the part of the air carrier, in the absence of special
legislation, cannot be other than simple prudence and diligence. It
is fitting that the carrier be required to perform with much diligence
and care for the safety of passengers, but the essentially dangerous
character and nature of aviation cannot impose on the carrier such a
degree of perfection, that exhausting the precautions possible of
occurring to the human mind, the passenger can be relieved of all
danger."
Regarding the reasonable obligations of the carrier assumed in
the carriage contract, the Court said, ". . . To require of the public
air carrier proof of an act of God to exonerate itself from contractual
liability originating in an air accident, would be equivalent to forcing it to accept an obligation more serious than it assumes. The carrier
guarantees that it will take all the precautions relating to the proper
condition of the aircraft, the qualifications of the pilot, the carrying
out of schedules on approved routes, etc., but it cannot give an unlimited guarantee against the so-called 'risks of the air.' "
Third, the Court observed that even applying the provisions of
the Civil Code, the Code of Land Commerce and the Code of Maritime Commerce to air travel, the standard of care would be the same.
With respect to the Code of Land Commerce, the Court noted
the difference between "public" and "private" carriers expressed in
Art. 2713 and cited with approval a 1941 case 4 to show that the stand3 Art. 271: "Transportation enterprises are private and public. Private carriers are those which, engaging in the transportation business, have not offered
their services to the public and which freely engage in the transportation of persons and goods at agreed prices. Public carriers are those which have a transportation establishment announced and open to the public, and carriage is effected at
the times and prices and under the conditions previously fixed in their announcements."
4 April 23, 1941 G.J. Vol. 51, p. 461.
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ard of care of a "public carrier," by virtue of Art. 3225 is different
from that of a "private carrier" under Art. 306.6 The cited case, dealing with transportation by aerial cable car, held that under Art. 306, a
private carrier could only escape liability by showing that the accident
occurred because of an act of God, while Art. 322 (Section 4) required
merely showing absence of fault (prudence and diligence) on the
part of the public carrier. In. the Marshall decision the Court found
Art. 306 "incompatible" with air transportation by public carriers.
Prior decisions had been almost unanimous in holding that a
public carrier in land transportation was required to prove an act of
7
God to escape liability.
On the application of the Civil Code, Art. 2072, to air transportation, the Court in another dictum in the Marshall case found that the
terms of this article indicate a distinction between liability of a carrier for transportation of persons and for transportation of things.
".. . the first part of Art. 2072 prescribes that the carrier is liable for
the injury to a person carried, occurring as a result of the bad condition
of the vehicle, ship or vessel in which the carriage is effected; the second part of the article, relating to the carriage of things, makes a
carrier liable for the destruction of cargo unless it proves an inherent
defect in the cargo or an act of God." The Court concluded: "The
Civil Code . . . exonerates the carrier of persons by mere proof of

absence of fault."
Going further, the Court said that only if the Land Commercial
Code permitted the above interpretation, could that Code be applied
to air transportation. If not, then the provisions of the Civil Code and
the Maritime Code would govern. As seen above, the application of
the Civil Code to air carriage of persons results in a duty of prudence
and diligence, and, in the view of the Court, the same standard of care
results from the application of the Maritime Code, Art. 353.
Two subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court in air carriage
cases adhered to the doctrine of the Marshall case.8 The latest published Supreme Court decision on liability of air carriers for death
or injury to passengers, that of Sept. 27, 1955,9 reviews the previous
cases on the subject and reaffirms the holding in the Marshall case.
5 Art. 822: "Public carriers are under the obligation: Sec. 4-To
indemnify
passengers for injury which they may suffer in their persons, due to bad condition
of the vehicle, due to the fault of the carriers and that of their drivers and postboys."
6 Art. 306: "The carrier is liable for both slight and gross negligence in the
fulfillment of the obligations imposed by the carriage. It is presumed that the loss,
damage or delay occurred through negligence of the carrier. In order to exonerate
itself from all liability, the carrier must prove that the act of God did not result
in the damage through its negligence, and that its care and experience were ineffective to prevent or modify the effects of the accident that caused the loss, dam-

age or delay."
7 Nov. 19, 1927 G.J. Vol. 38, p. 96; April 2, 1943 Vol. 55, p. 416; March 21, 1939
Vol. 48, p. 193; Nov. 30, 1935 No. 1905, p. 178; May 31, 1938 No. 1936, p. 572; Nov.
25, 1938 Vol, 47, p. 409.
8 Nov. 29, 1946 G.J. Vol. 61, p. 661; Aug. 27, 1947 G.J. Vol. 62, p. 678.
9 Sept. 27, 1955 G.J. Vol. 81, p. 162.

57
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In the 1955 case an aircraft of AVIANCA was on an instrument
flight in bad weather and crashed into a mountain near the airport
of Bucaramanga, causing the death of all aboard. The Court held the
defendant liable for failing to take proper precautions in the maintenance of emergency radio equipment at the airport, the malfunctioning of which prevented adequate transmission of weather information
to the flight in question.
The Court stated, "The appellant (airline) . . . asserts . . . the

doctrine of the Court, by virtue of which an air carrier is charged
with a general obligation of prudence and diligence and therefore is
exonerated from liability by proving absence of fault ...

This Court

reiterates this doctrine, developed especially in the following decisions: April 23, 1941 G.J. Vol. 51 p. 461; May 15, 1946 G.J. Vol. 60
p. 430; Nov. 29, 1946 Vol. 61 p. 661; Aug. 27, 1947 G.J. Vol. 62 p. 678;
and corrects those of April 23, 1954 G.J. Vol. 77 p. 411; and Nov. 23,
1954 G.J. Vol. 79 p. 665, in keeping with this same doctrine."
"Therefore, in case of accident, air carriers, to exonerate themselves
from liability originating in the carriage contract, need prove only
that they have taken all the measures conducing to the complete fulfillment of their obligation to transport the passenger without injury
to his destination. This Court has reviewed the juridical construction
elaborated in these decisions, with diverse elements of the positive
law, since the positive law does not have special provisions concerning
the mentioned type of transportation, and the Court considers such
construction adjusted to the law, the peculiar nature of air navigation
and the general doctrine on this important subject."
Thus, it can be affirmed that the doctrine of the Supreme Court
establishing the duty of simple "prudence and diligence," and allowing
a public air carrier to escape liability for death or injury to passengers
by showing "absence of fault" without having to attribute the accident
to an act of God, is the present rule of law in Colombia.
Commentaries of Leading Colombian Publicists
In Colombia, a Civil Law country, 10 the written commentaries of
jurists and outstanding legal writers, called tratadistas, are often of
greater importance in the development of the law, than under the
Anglo-American system in which the doctrine of stare decisis predominates. And attention to the opinion of publicists is necessary in
a subject such as Air Law, on which there is no special legislation on
passenger liability of air carriers.
While in general, all of the writers on the subject agree with the
views of the Supreme Court in the Marshall case as to the unique
nature of air transportation and the need for special laws, they
10 Colombia's historical and traditional ties are with Spain and France. The

Colombian Civil Code was patterned after the Bello Code of Chile, which was based
on the French Code. Colombia's Commercial Codes were adopted from those of the
former State of Panama, which in turn were based on Chilean legislation.
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unanimously disagree with the Court's interpretation of the nature of
the air carriage contract and the application of the Civil and Commercial Codes to air transportation.
In the Marshall case the Court did not directly discuss the classification of the transportation contract in terms of traditional Civil Law
definitions, but, emphasizing the factor of risk, found the contract of
air carriage implied a duty to use proper means in carrying out the
contract, rather than a guarantee of successful completion of the carriage. The precise nature of the transportation contract in Civil Law
countries has been the subject of many divergent views expressed by
European writers."
In his article, "La Responsabilidad Civil del Transportador
A~reo," 12 Dr. Alberto Zuleta-Angel' 3 attacks the reasoning and the conclusions of the Court in the Marshall case. He refers to the division of
obligations to perform (obligaciones de hacer) made by Demogue' 4
into obligations to take proper means (obligaciones de medio) and
obligations to accomplish a certain result (obligaciones de resultado).
Dr. Angel strongly affirms that the carrier's obligation is to transport
the passenger safe and sound to his destination, and not simply to use
proper means to effect this result. Therefore, he finds, the carrier is
liable for non-fulfillment of this obligation unless it can show that the
interruption of the carriage was due to an act of God or the intervention of a foreign element. In his terms, the carrier's obligation is an
obligaci6n de resultado and not an obligaci6n de medio. The fact that
the carrier operated with diligence and prudence is insufficient to exonerate it, as this type of defense is only applicable to obligaciones de
medio.
Dr. Alvaro P~rez-Vives, 15 in his authoritative treatise on obligations' 6 classifies the contract of transportation as the most important
example of the obligaci6n de resultado, and argues along the line of
reasoning of Dr. Zuleta-Angel.
Agreeing with the views expressed by these authors are Dr. Carlos
Samper-Wills 17 and Professor Carlos Holguin.' Dr. Pablo Emilio
Jurado, 19 while basing his opposition to the standard of care of "pru"1Ortega-Torres, C6digo de Comereio Terrestre (Bogota, 1956), p. 98.
12 Revista Trimestral de Derecho Comercial, No. 2 (1947).
13 Professor of Commercial Law, National University; ex-Magistrate of the
Supreme Court; legal commentator of great prestige.
14 Demogue, Traitd des Obligations, Vol. 5, No. 123.
15 Professor of Law, National University; Member of the Society of Comparative Legislation, Paris; Authority on obligations.
16 P6rez-Vives, Teoria General de las Obligaciones, Vol. III (Bogota, 1953)
p. 163 et seq.
17 Colombian attorney; author of the book, El Contrato de Transporte Adreo y
la Responsabilidad, (Bogota, 1947).
18 Professor of Law, National University; author of the article, "La Responsabilidad del Transportador A6reo y el Contrato de Seguro," Revista Juridica. No.
20 (April, 1951).
19 Specialist in Air Law; former Counsel and Director General of Civil Aeronautics.
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dence and diligence" on the practical problems of the plaintiff in
producing evidence of specific fault in aviation accidents, and on the
unequal capacity of the plaintiff and the carrier to sustain losses, would
20
impose a system of strict liability.
The mentioned writers, cite several Supreme Court cases 21 dealing
with land transportation, in which cases the Court found the obligation of safe carriage to be an obligaci6n de resultado.
In addition to attacking the Court's interpretation of the air carriage contract as expressed in the Marshall case, the majority of writers
also disagree with the Court's application of the various Codes to air
transportation which application was presented in dicta.
Regarding the application of the Code of Land Commerce, Art. 306
and Art. 1322 (Sec. 4) and the distinction between public and private
carriers' duties found in these provisions, Dr. Zuleta-Angel affirms
"it is indubitable that the doctrine established by Art. 306 (requiring
evidence of act of God to escape liability) is applicable to public
carriers. This is expressly provided by Art. 318."22 He would apply
these provisions to air transportation. For support of his position he
cites a 1938 railroad case 23 in which the Supreme Court stated that
Art. 306 is applicable to public carriers by virtue of Art. 318. Other
writers on the subject agree with Dr. Zuleta-Angel.
None of the commentators accept the difference observed by the
Court in the obligations of carriers of persons (first part of Art. 2072
of the Civil Code) and carriers of goods (second part of the same
article) . They assert that the Civil Code should not be interpreted so
as to give more protection to goods than to human life. The Court's
dictum applying the Code of Maritime Commerce to air transportation
by analogy, is also generally rejected.
It should be observed that although these outstanding jurists and
commentators have strongly criticized the doctrine set forth in the
Marshall case, their criticism has been of no avail. In view of the
unanimity of their views and the prestige they enjoy in a country which
usually gives great weight to the writings of tratadistas, it is truly
surprising that all of their arguments have fallen on deaf ears. The
net effect has been that the mentioned doctrine, followed in later
cases, has become more firmly established.
The reasoning of these writers is cogent and convincing on the
general nature of the carriage contract in the context of the Colombian
legal system. Under this system it is logical that a public carrier be
held to an obligation of safe carriage to destination. The emphasis
given by the Court in the Marshall case to the factor of risk is not
justified. Nearly all human activity involves some risk and no carrier,
20 Jurado, "El Transporte Adreo en Colombia," Cuadernos Juridicos, Nos. 7,
8, 9 (Dec. 1947).
21 Supra, note 7.
22 Art. 318: "The provisions of this Title (which includes Art. 306 relating to
private carriers) are applicable to public carriers."
23 Nov. 28, 1938 G.J. No. 1943, p. 44.
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whether engaged in land, sea, or air transportation, can guarantee
absolute and perfect security at all times. If evidence of specific fault
is available, then there is little question of liability. But the lack of
any clear indication of the causes of accidents is frequent in aviation
cases, and this was true in the Marshall incident.
The essential question is "Who is going to bear the loss?", or "Who
has the burden of proof?" Should the carrier be given the burden of
showing the intervention of a foreign element to escape liability? Or
should the plaintiff be required to show specific fault on the part of
the carrier in all cases?
As to the matter of producing evidence it is obvious that the carrier is in a far better position to explain the non-fulfillment of the
carriage contract. It has available all the records dealing with its operations and is intimately familiar with the details of its activities and
the dangers inherent in them.
The relative abilities of plaintiff and carrier to sustain losses is
certainly a debatable question and examples can be given to show how
unlimited claims can adversely affect an airline. At any rate, the award
to the plaintiff of $100,000.00 Colombian pesos by the Trial Court
in the Marshall case would have been a very heavy burden on the
airline if the decision had not been reversed on appeal.
The basic philosophy behind the Supreme Court doctrine in the
Marshall case is expressed in this part of the decision: "Therefore, the
decisions of the Court must fill the vacuum (of special legislation)
constructing a doctrine which best harmonizes with our general legal
order, without forgetting the special characteristics of air transportation, and the necessity of the Nation to stimulate its growth and development." (emphasis supplied)
It is submitted that the Court determined to protect the nascent
air transportation industry from ruinous lawsuits by devising a doctrine
which allows the airline to exonerate itself when the specific cause
of an accident is unknown. In effect, then, it is the passenger or his
heirs who must ultimately bear the loss relating to an injury or death
of a passenger in the mentioned circumstances. This reasoning loses
much force in view of the extensive development of aviation liability
insurance.
In the Marshall decision, the Court's dicta on the application of the
Land Commercial Code and Civil Code, with the careful distinctions
between public and private carriers, and between carriage of goods
and persons, is not so much a contribution to the interpretation of
the air carriage contract as it is an attempt to give support to the
Court's basic philosophy expressed in the body of the opinion.
Validity of Clauses Limiting Liability
It is necessary, in determining the contractual liability of air carriers for injury or death of passengers, to consider the legal and prac-

PASSENGER LIABILITY IN COLOMBIAN LAW

tical value of clauses limiting liability. The practice of inserting such
clauses in conditions of passenger tickets and tariffs is of long and
wide-spread usage. The legal validity of these clauses in the light of
legislation, decisions of the Supreme Court and opinions of commentators will now be discussed, leaving the practical value to later consideration.
Art. 1604 of the Civil Code, which fixes the general obligations
and rights of parties to a contract, states in part:"

. . .

nevertheless, it

is understood that these provisions are without prejudice to special
stipulations of the laws and the express stipulations of the parties."
Clearly, the freedom of contract here presented is limited by Art. 1522
of the Civil Code which invalidates clauses condoning future wilful
misconduct (dolo), and by Art. 63 of the same Code, which makes
gross negilgence (culpa grave) equivalent to wilful misconduct. The
Supreme Court has so held, adding that in any case a clause thus limiting liability will have at least the effect of inverting the burden of
24
proof.
With special reference to the transportation contract, Art. 2072
of the Civil Code makes a carrier of goods liable for their destruction
or damage, unless the carrier can prove latent defect in the goods or
act of God, or unless it can show stipulations to the contrary in the
carriage contract. This latter provision would seem to be limited by
Art. 8 of Law 52 of 1919 prohibiting the use by public carriers of
goods, of clauses which limit the obligations or liability of carriers.
While the two legislative provisions just mentioned refer specifically to goods only, Art. 329 of the Code of Land Commerce states
that "The printed tickets issued by public carriers with clauses limiting liability to a stipulated sum do not exempt the carrier from complete indemnification of the passengers or shippers of goods for the
losses which they may justly prove to have suffered."
The Supreme Court decisions on the validity of exonerative clauses
in air transportation are three. First, in the Marshall case, the Court
extended its reasoning on the unique nature of air transportation to
the application of Art. 329 of the Code of Land Commerce and Art. 8
of Law 52 of 1919. It found these laws, like Art. 306 of the Land Commercial Code, "incompatible" with air transportation.
A clause in Marshall's ticket specified that "All travel is at the
entire risk of the passenger," and the Court found that this did not
imply any limitation on the contractual liability of the carrier with
respect to "risks of the air." The carrier is not held responsible anyway
for accidents arising from such risks. However, the Court added that
the validity of such clauses cannot be interpreted to condone future
wilful misconduct.
But while the Court seemed to give validity to the mentioned clause
in respect to "risks of the air" (which it did not define), this did not
24

Dec. 9, 1936 G.J. Vol. 44, p. 408.
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put the carrier in any better position. The Court concluded: "Thus,
with or without an exoneration clause for risks of the air, the company
need only prove that the accident was not generated by its fault;
therefore, it is sufficient to prove absence of fault, which is different
from proving an act of God or the intervention of a foreign element."
The important point here is that the carrier, even with the benefit of
such a clause must still prove prudence and diligence in its operations.
In a later (1947) case dealing with air transportation the Court
affirmed: "The clause exonerating a carrier from liability is not valid
in the contract of carriage of persons, whether by land, rivers, ocean
or by air, if on the basis of such clause, it is attempted to exonerate
the carrier from liability from all classes of fault, whether directly imputable to the carrier or to the persons for whom it is responsible." 25
However, referring specifically to the contract of carriage of persons by air, the Court in the above cited 1947 case said that in keeping
with Art. 1620 of the Civil Code which stipulates that if a clause in a
contract can be given meaning it should be, and in view of the fact
that the so-called "risks of the air" do not arise from the negligence
of the carrier, "the Court has ascribed to the exonerative clause in the
transportation of persons a limited and circumscribed meaning in
which it is valid. On this matter the decision of Nov. 29, 1946 can be
consulted." In that case 26 the effect of inverting the burden of proof
was ascribed to an exonerative clause, in the sense that the clause
permitted showing prudence and diligence, which if proved, would
shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff to show specific fault.
While in the Marshall case the Court did not define "risks of the
air," P6rez-Vives asserts that this term is equal to an act of God, such
as a sudden unpredictable storm en route, etc. This, he says, should
not be confused with acts indicating negligence of the carrier, as
would be the case of the breaking off of a wing, taking off in sub-normal
weather conditions, flying contrary to regulations, etc. In the Nov. 29,
1946 decision "risks of the air" were defined as "those risks not due
to deficiencies of the aircraft nor errors of the crew."
On the validity of clauses which limit liability to a certain maximum sum, the Court in the Marshall case referred to Art. 329 of the
Land Commercial Code, and Law 52 of 1919 (which prohibits use
of such clauses by public carriers of goods) and found these laws
"incompatible" with air transportation.
However, this position has apparently been changed by the decision
of Aug. 27, 1947 cited above. In this case the Court said, "In this
Chapter III (of the Code of Land Commerce) we find Art. 329 and
the application of Art. 8 of Law 52 of 1919. Some believe that these
last two provisions apply only to the transportation of things. But
for the Court, such an observation is not well founded, since human
25
26

Aug. 27, 1947 G.J. Vol. 62, p. 680.
Nov. 29, 1946 G.J. Vol. 61, p. 661.
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safety and integrity are in play and the rights which refer to these
cannot be renounced. Thus, the clause which diminishes liability or
exonerates a carrier from liability is illicit as against public policy."
Attempts to limit general contractual liability of air carriers for acts
of their servants or agents would be unenforceable according to this
same decision. This view is in accord with the opinions of the publicists. 27
The validity of clauses other than those which completely exempt
a carrier from all liability to passengers or which limit its liability to a
maximum sum, has not been passed on by the Court in air transportation cases. However, a "penal clause," specifying a certain amount as
damages, and not just a maximum, would apparently be unenforceable under Art. 1600 of the Civil Code. This article allows an obligor
to prove all incurred damages in spite of a penal clause.
On the subject of limitation of time for presenting claims, the
equivalent of a "Statute of Limitation" is considered a matter of
"public policy" in Colombian law. Clauses which extend or renounce
established legislative time limits would be held invalid, and presumably the same would apply to attempts to shorten such established
limits. Of course, if unrestricted shortening were allowed, this could
amount to practical exemption in an extreme case.
As to the non-fulfillment of "subsidiary obligations" resulting in
route deviation, delay, failure to honor a validly issued ticket, etc.,
clauses which specifically limit liability for breach of this type of
obligation would presumably not be against public policy, as not
dealing with safety of human life. But, if a limitation is expressed in
terms of a maximum sum recoverable, it is submitted that the Supreme
Court would find such limitations contrary to Art. 329 of the Code of
Land Commerce, as expressed in the 1947 airline case. An exonerative
clause would probably be subject to the same decision, and would be
found, in effect, unenforceable.
When clauses completely exonerating a carrier or limiting its liability are held unenforceable, this does not have the effect of destroying the entire contract. This is seen from the decisions cited above, in
all of which cases the contracts were held valid in spite of the mentioned clauses.28
Miscellaneous Factors Affecting Liability Claims
Although it has been shown that the legal value of clauses limiting
liability is in effect nil, these clauses have a practical value which
should be considered here. The experience of insurance companies
which indemnify Colombian airlines for passenger liability shows a
remarkably low incidence of claims.
27 Zuleta-Angel, "Clfiusulas de No Responsabilidad en el Contrato de Transporte," Revista Trimestralde Derecho Comercial, No. 1 (1947).
28 Samper-Wills and Holguin are of this view, and mention Art. 23 of the Warsaw Convention to show international agreement on the subject.
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Among the contributing factors is the tendency of the traveling
public to accept as valid the clauses limiting liability which are found
printed on tickets, schedules, public notices, etc. While it is probably
true that the general public in most parts of the world tends to accept
as controlling the printed conditions found in contracts and tickets, it
should be remembered that in Colombia, air travel has become the
accepted means of transportation by persons of all economic and
social groups, so that it is not uncommon to see barefoot campesinos
boarding flights of the several feeder lines and of the main airline,
AVIAN CA.
The socio-economic level of a large majority of the traveling public also tends to make that public less "claims conscious" than, for
example, the air-traveling public of the United States. Litigation in
Colombia is often long and costly, and except for the relatively small
group who have the financial resources to maintain a lengthy court
action and the education and training which tend to make them aware
of their rights, the public is not accustomed to think in terms of suits
against air carriers.
Also, the now well established doctrine of "prudence and diligence" in air carrier cases is known to attorneys handling litigation
in this field. Unless there is clear evidence available of specific fault
on the part of the carrier, the prospects for the plaintiff's attorney are
not very attractive. And the practical difficulties of producing evidence
showing the cause of an aviation accident are well known.
Of perhaps less apparent but nonetheless real influence on the
incidence of claims and suits is a local more which tends to discourage
initiative on the part of the heirs of an accident victim. It is strongly
felt, at least among the middle and lower economic groups, that seeking indemnification for the death of a relative is unseemly.
The relative importance of the above factors is impossible to
evaluate exactly. However, experience indicates that the general
credulity of the public concerning clauses limiting liability seems to
be of prime importance. The effectiveness of these clauses in discouraging litigation is suggested by the fact that aviation enterprises
continue to use restrictive or exonerative clauses despite declarations
of the Supreme Court holding them unenforceable.
PART

II.

EXTRACONTRACTUAL LIABILITY

The standard of care established by the Supreme Court in respect
to contractual liability of air carriers, i.e. "prudence and diligence,"
applies as well to the field of extracontractual liability. But there are
some important consequences worth noting in regard to whether a
cause of action is based on contractual or extracontractual liability.
Also, the aspect of air transportation as a "dangerous activity" must
be considered.
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General Concepts
The basis for extracontractual liability in Colombian law is found
in Art. 1494 of the Civil Code, which includes as a source of obligaon another." This
tions: "an act which has inflicted injury or damages
29
omission.
or
commission
of
one
either
act can be
The obligation to indemnify injuries unintentionally caused is
provided in Articles 2341, 2347, and 2356 of the Civil Code. Art. 2341
reads: "One who has committed an intentional wrong or negligence,
which has inflicted an injury upon another, is obligated to indemnify
the other, without regard to the principal sanction which the law
(criminal) may impose for the negligence or intentional wrong committed." Under Art. 2347, a person is held liable for the negligent
acts of persons for whom he is responsible, such as agents, employees,
etc. And Art. 2356 provides that one is liable for injuries caused by
dangerous activities in which he may be engaged.
It will be noted that Art. 2341 includes both intentional wrongs
(delitos) and unintentional wrongs or negligence (cuasidelitos). It
has been held that these two civil wrongs are different in nature. For
the first to exist, it is necessary that the defendant has actually desired
that the injury be inflicted, and that he acted with this purpose. For
the second, it is necessary only that the injury has occurred through
imprudence or negligence, by act or omission, that is, through an
"error in conduct" which would not have been committed by a prudent
individual placed in the same external circumstances as the defendant.80
The three principal elements of an action for extracontractual
liability are succinctly stated in a decision of the Supreme Court on
April 30, 1937:31 "Injury caused to a person gives rise to a legal relationship between the victim and the author of the injury. The inherent
and recognized elements of this relationship which must be proved
in the corresponding suit are: an injury, a culpable act, and a necessary
relation of causation."
In Colombia the theory of extracontractual liability called teoria
del riesgo creado or teoria objetiva, in which it is completely sufficient
merely to show that a person suffered an injury in order for the victim
to have a right to indemnification, has been rejected by the Court and
the publicists. The element of blame-worthiness or culpability of the
act causing the injury continues to be the fundamental of civil lia32

bility.

On the general definition of negligence, the Supreme Court has
said that it consists of "an error of conduct which a diligent and
29 May 26, 1946 G.J. No. 1909, p. 584.
30 Feb. 20, 1948 G.J. Vol. 63, p. 699.
31 April 30, 1937 G.J. Vol. 45, p. 42.
32 May 31, 1941 G.J. Vol. 51, p. 523. Nov. 18, 1940 G.J. Vol. 50, p. 439. PerezVives op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 54, 59. Robledo-Uribe, "Presunci6n de Culpa y de Responsabilidad," Revista Juridica (April, 1951) p. 35.
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prudent person placed in the same external circumstances of the defendant would not have committed."8 8 As to the standard of conduct
involved in this concept of negligence, the Court has held that "The
conduct of the defendant must be compared with that of an average,
normally prudent man placed in the same objective situation as the
defendant."8 4 This is the modern definition accepted by such authors
as Prez-Vives.88
Burden of Proof

As was seen in the discussion of contractual liability, the matter of
who has the burden of proof and how this burden of proof is met
is a most important question. Art. 1757 of the Civil Code provides:
"One who alleges the existence of obligations or their extinction has
the burden of proving same ... Evidence consists of public and private
documents, witnesses, presumptions, confessions, sworn statements
and personal inspection by the judge or prefect." This article should
be read in conjunction with Art. 1604 of the same Code, which states
in part: ".

.

. It is incumbent on one who is obligated to exercise

diligence and care to prove same; it is incumbent on one who alleges
act of God to prove same."
Since 1897 the Supreme Court has uniformly interperted Art. 1604
as follows: "In every case it is incumbent upon the party who should
have exercised prudence and diligence to prove same, whether dealing
with a breach of contract, an intentional wrong or negligence."8 6
Air CarrierDecisions
In the only Supreme Court decision directly on the extracontractual
liability of air carriers for death or injury to passengers, Calle et al vs.
AVIANCA, decided on Sept. 27, 1955,87 the Court held that its interpretation of the contractual liability of air carriers, expressed in other
actions consolidated for decision, was equally applicable to this extracontractual demand based on Art. 2341 and Art. 2347 of the Civil
Code. In the contractual actions referred to, the Court reiterated:
"In dealing with air transportation, the carrier is exonerated from
liability on proving absence of fault, that is, the complete fulfillment
of the expressed obligation of prudence and care. This includes showing that the carrier took all means and precautions in order to avoid
the occurrence of an accident." "It is the carrier who must prove his
own diligence and not the victim (who must prove) lack of diligence
of the carrier."
In this case, the Court found that faulty maintenance of emergency
radio equipment, indicated in the Civil Aeronautics Authority's offi88 May 26, 1936 G.J. No. 1909, p. 591.
84

May 31, 1938 G.J. No. 1936, p. 572. Feb. 20, 1948 G.J. Vol. 63, p. 699.

35 P~rez-Vives op. cit. Vol. II, p. 71.
86 Dec.
87

17, 1897 G.J. No. 652, p. 221. Feb. 6, 1936 G.J. No. 1905, p. 283.
Sept. 27, 1955 G.J. Vol. 81, p. 162.
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cial accident investigation report, showed lack of prudence and diligence of the carrier.
Since in this case the standard of care required of air carriers was
held to be the same whether actions are based on contractual or extracontractual liability, decisions finding lack of prudence and diligence
in contractual actions are applicable to this discussion. In one decision 88 the defendant airline was held liable for the death of a passenger in a crash due to the falling off of a wing and a float during a
hydroplane flight under normal conditions.
In another passenger death case, the defendant was held negligent
in not providing its plane with radio equipment which would have
allowed the pilot to receive warning of bad weather along the route
and thus avoid the fatal crash resulting from an attempted emergency
landing in adverse atmospheric conditions. 89
It should be noted that in meeting the burden of proof by establishing the prudence and diligence of its operations, the carrier must
take into account the reports of the official accident investigation
commissions of the Civil Aeronautics Authority. In the 1955 decision
cited above, the Court reaffirmed the rule that such reports (a) have
legal value in civil and criminal proceedings, (b) are "public documents" not requiring the usual evidence of proper issuance and execution of formalities, (c) may be admitted in evidence, and (d) have
the probative value of tending to show whether or not the carrier
fulfilled its duty of prudence and diligence. Of course, such reports
may be supported or rebutted in the ordinary manner by the parties.
Comparison of Contractual and ExtracontractualActions
The consequences of actions based on contractual and extracontractual liability are compared by the Court in the 1955 decision and
are summarized as follows: in the action based on breach of contract,
the origin of the right to damages is based on contractual obligations,
while the extracontractual action originates in the culpable act or
negligence. The actions are different from the standpoint of the
cause of the damage, in that in the one there is non-fulfillment of a
determined benefit agreed upon, while in the other, the cause is nonobservance of a general rule of good conduct.
The object is different in that in one action, it is sought to establish the balance of preconstituted interests, specific and complete,
and related to the contract, while in the other it is sought to repair
the damage caused to the personal, individual interests of the party
prejudiced. The status of the moving party is different in that on the
one hand, it is the representative of the contracting party, while on
the other hand it is any other person affected by the conduct of the
actor. The act giving rise to the obligation to indemnify is evidenced
38 Nov. 29, 1946 G.J. Vol. 61, p. 661.

89 Aug. 27, 1947 G.J. Vol. 62, p. 678.
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by the contract in the case of contractual action, and in the extracontractual action the alleged wrongful act must be demonstrated, either
directly or by presumption.
The extent of damages in the contractual action is only foreseeable
damages, while in the extracontractual action both foreseeable and
unforeseeable damages are recoverable. The interests which are affected
are distinct, in that in one it is the material interests of the party to
the contract, either claimed by the victim himself or his heirs, and in
the extracontractual claim, the personal and exclusive interests of the
party who suffers a loss.
Also, there are certain aspects peculiar to one or the other action,
such as the compensaci6n de culpas (similar to the concept of comparative negligence in Anglo-American Law) which in extracontractual
liability may reduce or nullify the claim for indemnification. In the
contractual action this principle does not operate. The periods of
Statutes of Limitation are different - 20 years in the action based on
breach of contract, and 3 years when the action is based on extracon
tractual liability.
Of interest in this same decision was the holding that the same act
may give rise to both contractual and extracontractual liability and
that an heir of a deceased passenger may choose either the one basis
or the other. But he may not present both causes of action in the same
complaint, unless separate and distinct damages are alleged under
each cause of action. If both causes of action are included in the same
complaint, without showing separate injuries, the Court will look to
the contractual claim and disregard the extracontractual action, as
was also demonstrated in the Marshall decision and the case of Aug.
27, 1947.40

The decision is instructive, moreover, in showing that Colombian
procedural law, allows the consolidation of contractual and extracontractual actions of different plaintiffs when these actions arise from the
same incident and also that the Court will apply evidence adduced in
one suit to other suits consolidated for decision. In addition, the modern doctrine that although death of a passenger may be instantaneous,
the cause of action for damages survives and may be brought by heirs
of the deceased was affirmed. On this point the Court cited Art. 2077
of the Civil Code as a basis for survival of actions arising from transportation accidents.
Air Transportationas a "Dangerous Activity"
In the above discussion it is seen that, in general, one who injures
another through conduct which a prudent and diligent person placed
in the same external circumstances as the defendant would not have
committed, will be held liable for the injuries caused. The defendant
40

Aug. 27, 1947 G.J. Vol. 62, p. 678.
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is not obligated to indemnify the plaintiff if the defendant can show
that he, in fact, did act with prudence and diligence. In effect, Art.
2341 and 2347, in combination with Art. 1604 of the Civil Code create
a presumption of fault which is destroyed by evidence of proper conduct. These general principles have been applied to extracontractual
liability actions in air transportation, as seen in the case of Calle et al
vs. AVIANCA.
However, since 1938 the Supreme Court has found in another provision of the Civil Code a presumption of liability which the defendant
can only rebut by showing the accident was due to the intervention
of a foreign element, act of God, or fault of the victim. This provision
concerns so-called "dangerous activities" and is contained in Art. 2356
of the Civil Code. This article reads: "As a general rule any injury
which can be imputed to the malice or negligence of another must
be indemnified by that other. Especially obligated to make this indemnification are the following:" Several examples are given, such as
the imprudent discharge of firearms, removal of sewer system covers,
etc.
In a 1939 case of passenger transportation by aerial cable car,4 1
the Court affirmed that Art. 2356 is not a mere repetition of Art. 2341
and that the examples of dangerous activities given under Art. 2356
are not exclusive but only illustrative. It said that Art. 2341 permits
exoneration by showing prudence and diligence while Art. 2356 requires showing intervention of a foreign element.
In this case the Court adopted the analysis of Art. 2356 given in an
automobile accident case of 1938:42 "In Art. 2356 we cannot but find
a presumption of liability. Therefore, the burden of proof is not upon
the injured but rather upon the one who caused the injury, by the
mere showing that the injury can be imputed to malice or negligence.
In this interpretation, it is not that the basic concept of our legislation in general on the presumption of innocence is destroyed ... Rather
it is that, simply keeping in mind the essential differences of cases, the
Court recognizes that in activities characterized by their dangerousness, of which the use and driving of an automobile is an example,
the nature of the inherently dangerous activity and the general way
in which injuries are caused by this activity prevent the injured from
having at his disposal the necessary elements of proof."
"Our Art. 2356 understood in this manner, does not permit the
author of the injury to allege that he was not at fault, nor can he with
this allegation require the injured to prove the author's negligence.
Rather, to escape liability, the author must destroy the mentioned presumption by demonstrating at least one of these factors: act of God,
or the intervention of a foreign element."
Other decisions have established the following interpretation of
41
42

April 18, 1939 G. J. Vol. 48, p. 164.
March 14, 1938 G.J. Vol. 46, p. 216.
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Art. 2356: it is necessary that the thing causing the injury, either operated by man or not, be dangerous, or that the activity in which it
is used be dangerous; 48 in case of concurrence of responsibility for
injury caused by the simple act of another (Art. 2341, 2347) and
responsibility for injury caused by a thing used by another (Art. 2356),
the rules applicable to the latter responsibility will be applied; 4 4 when
the foreign element is not exclusive, it is not exonerative - if the fault
of the operator of the thing concurs with the fault of a third party,
the third party may be sued for full liability, and if it concurs with
the fault of the victim, the principle of comparative negligence is
45
applicable.
A few decisions find only a presumption of fault in Art. 2356 instead of a presumption of liability, thus allowing the defendant to
meet the burden of proof by showing prudence and diligence instead
of intervention of a foreign element.46 But the vast majority of cases
require intervention of a foreign element for exoneration. 7 This latter
view is supported by Colombian legal writers.48
When can an injury be "imputed to malice or negligence" under
Art. 2356? The Court and the commentators have responded uniformly: when the activity involved is characterized as "dangerous."
The following are some examples of activities which the Supreme
Court has found to be dangerous under Art. 2356: excavation with
dynamite;4 9 maintenance of municipal high tension power lines; 0
construction of a building;5 ' municipal supply of electricity to a private house;5 2 driving an automobile; 53 operation of a railroad; 54 operation of a foundry. 55 One of the few cases in which the Court specifically held that an activity alleged to be dangerous was not so, was
that of the operation of a municipal slaughterhouse. 56 With regard to
the transportation of passengers, the Court has held that railroad57 and
aerial cable car service 58 are "dangerous activities" under Art. 2356.
While this article has not been directly applied to airline passenger
transportation, the decision of Aug. 21, 1951 is highly significant in
declaring that the operation of aircraft is a dangerous activity under
Art. 2356. In that case5 9 an Air Force DC-3 was making a landing after
48

April 29, 1943 G.J. Vol. 55, p. 285.

44 Feb. 3, 1944 G.J. Vol. 57, p. 28.

45 Dec. 2, 1943 G.J. Vol. 56, p. 322.
Dec. 4, 1945 G.J. Vol. 70, p. 820.
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47 Aug. 25, 1953 G.J. Vol. 76, p. 172.
48 Prez-Vives op. cit. Vol. II, p. 183 et seq.
April 13, 1941 G.J. Vol. 51, p. 446.
50 June 10, 1952 G.J. Vol. 72, p. 396.
51 June 9, 1953 G.J. Vol. 75, p. 285.
52 Sept. 30, 1953 G.J. Vol. 76, p. 417.
58 March 14, 1938 G.J. Vol. 46, p. 216.
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May 18, 1938 G.J. No. 1936, p. 518.
55 Feb. 22, 1952 G.J. Vol. 71, p. 114.
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56 Sept. 11, 1952 G.J. Vol. 73, p. 221.
57 Aug. 25, 1953 G.J. Vol. 76, p. 172.
58 April 18, 1939 G.J. Vol. 48, p. 164.
59 Aug. 21, 1951 G.J. Vol. 80, p. 312.
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a training flight and the control tower, operated by the Colombian
Government, gave this plane clearance to land. The tower advised the
DC-3 that there was a light plane also attempting to land, but that
the light plane would be given the "red light." Either the pilot of the
light plane, also on an instruction flight, did not receive the wave-off
or did not heed same. At any event, there was a collision of the two
planes resulting in the death of all aboard both. The widow of the Air
Force pilot of the DC-3 sued the Colombian Government for negligence
in the operation of the control tower in failing to adequately control
traffic.
The plaintiff's demand was based generally on Title 34 of the
Civil Code which deals with extracontractual liability and contains
Art. 2356. The Court cited this artcle and in finding the Government
liable, said: "There is no doubt that aviation operations amount to
what the decisions of the Supreme Court have defined as a dangerous
activity. If on many occasions decisions of the Court have accepted
that driving an automobile is that kind of activity, then with more
reason, it must be accepted that operating an airplane is a dangerous
activity. Thus, the law imposes a presumption of fault on the part of
an airport operator for accidents occurring within the airport. (Law
89 of 1938, Art. 63)."
"Therefore, it is not the victim who must prove negligence or
carelessness, because the presumption operates in his favor. It is the
defendant, here the Nation, who must exonerate itself from this presumption by establishing either: act of God, or the intervention of a
foreign element, which can be the imprudence or carelessness of the
victim himself."
Strictly speaking, this decision held that operating an airport is a
dangerous activity, but the declaration that "operating an airplane is
a dangerous activity" bears directly on the extracontractual liability
of air carriers. Also, it should be remembered that the rationale of the
Court's decision in the Marshall case was based on the "essentially
dangerous character and nature of aviation."
It is submitted that if a cause of action were based on Art. 2356 in
a case of airline passenger extracontractual liability, the Colombian
Supreme Court would find air transportation a "dangerous activity"
and would require the defendant airline to show either act of God or
intervention of a foreign element in order to rebut the presumption
of liability.
Because of the characteristic obscurity as to the causes of aviation
accidents, the application of Art. 2356 can have serious and far-reaching implications in the determination of passenger liability of air
carriers in Colombia.

